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THE THREE STEPS REQUIRED FOR ORIGINALIST 
INTERPRETATION:  HOW DISTORTIONS APPEAR AT 
EACH STAGE 
David Crump* 
Originalism is often the most satisfactory method of interpreting 
texts.  But originalism is only one of a number of modalities of 
interpretation, all of which have to be kept in mind.  Sometimes 
originalism is not the best method of reading a text. 
Originalist interpretation requires three distinct steps.  First, a 
court must determine that originalism is the preferred method of finding 
meaning in the text at issue.  This decision can create problems if 
originalism is actually not the method the court plans to use even though 
the court has said so.  And sometimes the court may decide in the midst 
of the process to use parts of another method. 
The second step is to find the original meaning.  Here, the problem 
is that there are many sources one can consult to find this meaning, 
ranging from those close to the time of the event to those spread over 
time.  Finally, the third step is to fit the original meaning to the different 
circumstances of today.  Sometimes, this step receives only casual 
treatment, perhaps because the court has already slogged through the 
hard work inherent in the first two steps and implicitly finds this 
accomplishment enough.  Sometimes the differences are so great that 
originalism cannot reliably be used. 
The only way to deal with these problems is for the court to try its 
way through the process, retaining an awareness of the difficulties in 








 * A.B., Harvard University; J.D., University of Texas School of Law. John B. Neibel 
Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. 
 
354 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 I. Introduction ............................................................................. 354 
 II. The Originalist Approach ........................................................ 356 
 III. The Three Steps Required For Originalist Interpretation ....... 358 
A. Recognizing the Need for an Originalist Approach  
 (and Using It) ................................................................... 358 
B. The Second Step: Finding an Original Meaning ............. 360 
C. The Third Step: Fitting the Original Meaning to the  
 Present Day ...................................................................... 363 




Originalism is often the superior modality for reading texts.1  This 
historical method must be understood, however, as only one of many 
modalities for the purpose.  Professor Bobbitt’s2 list of six methods of 
reading the Constitution is one of the most authoritative descriptions of 
different modalities of interpretation.3  As this article will argue, 
originalism is the method that most often gives satisfactory results,4 
although not always. 
In Bobbitt’s taxonomy, there are six modalities of constitutional 
interpretation: textual, historical, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and 
ethical.5  The textual method focuses upon the logic of the language, 
while the historical method looks to a past meaning:6 the meaning at the 
time of adoption of the language, in the case of originalism.  The 
structural method seeks to preserve institutions set up by the provisions 
at issue, the doctrinal method finds meaning from earlier decisions, the 
prudential modality  provides a “policy” rationale by considering the 
effects of the various interpretations, and the ethical method attempts to 
find meaning that has an appropriate moral significance.7 
But the point here is that the historical method, and specifically the 
originalist modality, often provides satisfactory results.8  Still, all of the 
 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
 3. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1771, 1774-75 (1994) (treating Bobbitt’s categories as authoritative). 
 4. There is authority for the view that originalism is usually the superior method. See 
Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018). 
 5. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 3, at 1775. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See BOBBITT, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
 8. See infra Part II. See also Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2074 (explaining why 
originalism is the preferred method of analysis). 
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other methods have their places,9 and virtually no one claims that sound 
determination of which test to apply is easy.10 
The trouble is, however, that the appeal of originalism often comes 
wrapped in difficulties that can leave the result vulnerable to 
fundamental criticisms.11  The difficulties are hard to avoid.  To use an 
originalist method of interpretation, one has to go through three discrete 
steps.12  First, the interpreter must recognize the need for a reading that 
goes beyond the obvious and the literal: a reading, that is, that requires 
originalism.13  Second, the reader must figure out the original meaning, 
a puzzle that often is confusing.14  Finally, there is the third step: 
analogizing the original meaning with the claimed parallels of today.15  
All three steps can, in particular cases, be challenging in practice. 
This article begins, in Part II, by considering the meaning of 
originalism and its potential advantages.  This section describes different 
ways of using originalism. The article then moves on to consider the 
steps in applying this modality.  Part III begins by considering the first 
step, recognizing the need for interpretation, and then takes on the 
second step: that of assigning an accurate historical meaning to the 
doctrines at issue.  The next part of this article then sets out the 
difficulties inherent in the third step: fitting the historical meaning to the 
situations of today. 
A final section sets out the author’s conclusions.  These include 
recognition of the tendency of interpreters to cease their hard work after 
generating apparently sound results in step two by figuring out historical 
meanings, and then simply finessing the third step by settling on too-
facile analogies of historical meanings to modern doctrines.  Another set 
of conclusions deals with the situations that tend to confuse or frustrate 
sound completion of each step and with methods for avoiding 
prevarication.  These conclusions make clear another thrust of the article, 
which is to point out that sometimes, the three steps make originalism so 
unpredictable and uncertain that in the end, it may not always furnish the 
best method of reading the text. 
 
 9. See BOBBITT, supra note 2, at 8-9, 119 (explaining that all six modalities can confer 
legitimacy). 
 10. Id. at 12-13. 
 11. See infra Part III (describing the steps involved in originalism and the difficulties 
inherent in them). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Section III.A. 
 14. See infra Section III.B. 
 15. See infra Section III.C. 
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It is believed that this description of the three steps is original with 
the author.  Each step is analyzed here, together with examples showing 
how each can lead to dubious results if not properly applied. 
II. THE ORIGINALIST APPROACH 
In simple terms, originalism means the application of the original 
meaning of a doctrine.  That is, it uses the general meaning of the 
concepts underlying the doctrine at the time of its adoption.16  In 
interpreting the Constitution, for example, originalism would call for 
applying the understanding that the Framers would have shared about 
the doctrines they adopted in 1789.17  In interpreting the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, originalism would require a focus on the general meaning as 
understood by the legislators at the time they passed the statute.18 
But this simple statement raises a range of subsidiary questions.  
One inquiry concerns the precise incident that should concentrate the 
search for meaning.  Is it the Framers’ settlement of the terms of the 
Constitution in Philadelphia that matters, or is it the debates and votes 
on ratification?19  Different answers to that question may give different 
meanings to an originalist interpretation.20  And then, where does one 
find authoritative indications of the meanings that the Founders shared?  
Perhaps the answers lie in their debates, although this approach leaves 
gaps when only one side of an obviously live controversy draws forth 
most of the commentary.21 
 
 16. See BOBBITT, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
 17. That is, during the year of adoption of the Constitution. See, e.g., infra Section III.B. 
 18. See infra Section III.A for an example. 
 19. See generally Elliot’s Debates – About, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, 
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2021) (collecting 
sources, including Madison’s notes at the Constitutional Convention and debates in the State 
legislatures on ratification). 
 20. For example, the debates on ratification contain a great deal that explains the Contract 
Clause, which prohibits impairment by the States of the obligations of the contracts. The 
debates at the Constitutional Convention contain little that explains it, and the economic 
purposes of the Clause would not appear if an interpreter looked only to the Convention. See 
generally David Crump, The Economic Purpose of the Contract Clause, 66 SMU L. REV. 687 
(2013) (analyzing the original meaning of the Clause). 
 21. Cf. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Padilla, 363 P.3d 628, 674-75 (Cal. 2016) 
(Liu, J., concurring) (citing 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 176-77 (1881)). In THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, Jonathan Elliot memorialized the unopposed statement of James Iredell in 
the South Carolina ratification debates concerning the role of state legislatures in the 
amendment process. Id. In spite of lack of real debate, the court in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers 
Ass’n used Iredell’s statement to resolve issue of power of state legislature to have voters 
determine whether to send advisory message to Congress. Id. 
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Or perhaps the answers lie in much broader sources, such as 
dictionaries of the times.22  One might even conclude that these different 
sources call forth analyses that resemble not just different answers, but 
different kinds of originalism.23 
Then, there are still more diffuse historical approaches that are 
related to, if not exactly equivalent to, originalism.  For example, an 
interpreter might try to discern the historical issue to which a given 
doctrine was supposed to supply a solution.24  This method sometimes 
tends to elevate the highly specific question at issue, which may have no 
close analog today,25 over the greater principles established by the 
doctrines at issue, which probably ought to prevail in the interpretation 
of a Constitution composed of grandiloquent generalities.26 
Textual interpretation, or direct focus on the words and context of 
the provision being interpreted, is closely related to originalism,27 and, 
in fact, it sometimes is considered a type of originalism.28  After all, the 
Framers did not all agree on the terminology they used in their debates, 
or on dictionary definitions, or on the desired solutions to divisive 
issues.29  Instead, what they agreed on is the texts of the provisions they 
adopted.  Sometimes, a conclusion about the meaning of a text is 
different from a construction resulting from a focus on the original 
understanding of the provision adopted.  In that situation, a textual 
approach may be, but is not necessarily, superior to an originalist one. 
 
 22. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2671 (2015) (consulting several dictionaries written near in time to the Constitution). 
 23. In shifting from Framers’ debates to the dictionaries, for example, a court consults 
not the terms used by the Framers but the meanings observed by others. 
 24. See infra Section III.C (dealing with the decision in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400 (2012)). 
 25. See infra Section III.C (discussing the Jones case in which specific circumstances 
were given more weight than general principles). 
 26. See David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental 
Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 
837-38 (1996) (explaining that a constitution ought to be so composed, because a constitution 
sets out fundamental principles). 
 27. Both of these modalities focus upon the doctrine at issue, while other methods use 
extrinsic considerations. See Ilya Somin, “Active Liberty” and Judicial Power: What Should 
Courts Do to Promote Democracy?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1851 (2006). 
 28. See id. at 1851-52 (pointing how a Justice of the Supreme Court had conflated the 
two methods). 
 29. See id. at 1832. 
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III. THE THREE STEPS REQUIRED FOR ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATION 
A. Recognizing the Need for an Originalist Approach (and Using It) 
Sometimes the question for interpretation depends on an initial 
recognition of the need for an originalist approach.  This issue depends 
upon a court’s conclusion that interpretation is better resolved by 
resorting to originalism than to another method, such as textualism.  
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County30 exemplifies 
the struggle to decide between these two modalities.  The question, there, 
was the meaning of the provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibiting employment decisions made on account of “sex.”31  Did that 
term encompass differences based on sexual orientation, or did it cover 
only those involving gender?32 
Justice Gorsuch could have begun the analysis with observations he 
had made in Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States,33 which provide a 
solid description of the originalist approach: 
Written laws are meant to be understood and lived by. If a fog of 
uncertainty surrounded them, if their meaning could shift with the 
latest judicial whim, the point of reducing them to writing would be 
lost. That is why it’s a “fundamental canon of statutory construction” 
that words generally should be “interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted 
the statute.”34 
In fact, the opinion in Bostock suggests this approach as a 
beginning.35  This would have seemed to end the inquiry, because there 
was no basis for saying that the word “sex” included sexual orientation 
in 1964, and the parties agreed to this assumption for the sake of 
argument.36 
But Justice Gorsuch did not follow his own advice.  Instead, his 
Bostock opinion pronounces that the originalist approach is “just a 
starting point,”37 and it takes a twist that, instead of originalism, wanders 
into what seems to be textualism.38  It considers the statute not by what 
 
 30. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
 31. Id. at 1738; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964). 
 32. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739. 
 33. Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018). 
 34. Id. at 2074 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 35. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (calling for interpretation “in accord with the ordinary 
public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment”). 
 36. Id. at 1739. 
 37. Id. 
 38. The opinion focuses on the language and its meaning today. Id. (“The question isn’t 
what ‘sex’ meant, but what Title VII says about it.”). 
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the legislators meant by the term “sex” when they wrote it, but rather 
what is meant by their words.39  The opinion seems to make the question 
resolve itself by the overall logic of the language as used today, not as in 
1964.40  A difference based on sexual orientation, Justice Gorsuch 
reasoned, necessarily includes a difference based on sex, because 
differences in sexual orientation cannot occur absent differences in sex.41  
By now, Justice Gorsuch had arrived at a result that seemed most 
unlikely to resemble the meaning of the words at the time Congress 
enacted the statute.42 
The dissenters instead saw a steady reliance on the historical 
approach as more appropriate.43  If one considered what was meant 
publicly by the term “sex” during the 1960’s, the conclusion would be 
clear.44  It did not include sexual orientation.45  The result reached by this 
originalist approach, according to the dissenters, was more closely 
aligned with the understanding of the legislators.46  Thus, originalism 
gave a meaning coinciding with what the adopters of the language 
thought they meant, while Justice Gorsuch’s deviation into what appears 
to be a textualist approach depended instead on the logic of today, 
applied to the language itself.  Justice Alito labeled the Bostock opinion 
as a “brazen abuse” and as “preposterous.”47 
To some commentators, the switcheroo applied by Justice Gorsuch 
was not just wide of the mark, but far wide of it.  One usually 
circumspect source became unusually colorful in describing the Justice’s 
“living Constitution trance.”48  This staid commentator, the Wall Street 
Journal, went on to speculate that “[a]n alien appears to have occupied 
the body of Justice Neil Gorsuch as he wrote Monday’s opinion in 
Bostock v. Clayton County, which sometimes happens when Justices 
breathe the rarified air of the Supreme Court building.”49 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1740. 
 41. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (explaining that an employer firing a male employee who 
is attracted to men but not a female employee who is attracted to men is discriminating based 
on sex). 
 42. The parties so stipulated. Id. at 1739. 
 43. “ ‘ [S]ex’ still means what it has always meant.” Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755. Justice Kavanaugh also dissented. Id. at 1822 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 48. The Editorial Board, Editorial, Gorsuch v. Gorsuch, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2020, 
7:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gorsuch-vs-gorsuch-11592350714. 
 49. Id. 
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B. The Second Step: Finding an Original Meaning 
If a court first decides upon a historical approach such as 
originalism, it must next assign an original meaning to the doctrine at 
issue.  The Supreme Court’s tortuous path in interpreting the 
Confrontation Clause and its exclusion of some hearsay statements in 
criminal cases provides an example.50  A textual approach was 
impractical in resolving the issue, because the prohibition of hearsay is 
not explicit in the clause, and the language requires a large measure of 
implication to give it meaning.51  The resultant series of decisions shows 
the difficulty of the ostensibly simple exercise involved in assigning an 
original meaning to a doctrine of long ago.52 
The Confrontation Clause story begins with the Court’s decision in 
Ohio v. Roberts,53 which required the Justices to fashion a test for 
determining which types of hearsay were excluded by the clause.54  
Some kinds of hearsay, such as statements against interest55 by 
codefendants, are equivalent to unconfronted witness statements, but 
other kinds, such as business records56 and excited utterances,57 hardly 
seem to fit that characterization.  One type of declaration carried a 
substitute for created evidence, while the other did not.  The Roberts 
Court made the distinction with a relatively clear and workable test.  
Hearsay could be admitted in compliance with the Confrontation Clause 
if it carried indicia of reliability (or trustworthiness),58 which was a 
historical basis for establishing exceptions to the hearsay rule.59 
Then came Crawford v. Washington.60  The Court’s prior decisions 
about the doctrine of stare decisis61 indicated that Ohio v. Roberts should 
 
 50. See generally David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115 (2012) [hereinafter Crump Confrontation] (discussing standards 
for interpreting the Confrontation Clause). 
 51. That is, the interpretive issue is not set forth in the language of the Clause. See 
generally id. (discussing the proper interpretation of the Clause). 
 52. Id. at 116-18 (discussing varied treatment of the Clause). 
 53. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 54. Id. at 66 (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not exclude hearsay that “bears 
adequate ‘indicia of reliability’ ” ). 
 55. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 56. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 57. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 58. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 59. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 60. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 61. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 120-25 (discussing the Court’s decisions 
about departure from stare decisis). 
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have been preserved,62 but Justice Scalia’s opinion ignored that issue.63  
The main question, said Justice Scalia, was whether the hearsay 
statements at issue were “testimonial.”64  This allegedly originalist 
meaning, Justice Scalia said, derived from the history of the hearsay rule 
as it was treated before the adoption of the Confrontation Clause.65  The 
Crawford opinion offered a number of decisional examples in which 
Justice Scalia claimed that the outcome depended on whether the 
evidence at issue was testimonial, although none of the examples 
explicitly made the answer depend on that question.66 
Justice Scalia emphasized, as an example, Sir Walter Raleigh’s 
Case in which the defendant was accused of conspiring against the 
king.67  A principal piece of evidence against Raleigh was a written 
statement by a purported witness, Lord Cobham, who was incarcerated 
nearby.68  Raleigh objected, arguing that the Crown instead should 
produce Lord Cobham as a live witness, but the judges refused.69  From 
this precedent, Justice Scalia concluded that the concern of the 
Confrontation Clause, and its original meaning, was the exclusion of 
“testimonial” hearsay.70 
But the opinion shows how slippery, and how subject to 
manipulation, the determination of original meaning can be.  There was 
a second and equally offensive item of evidence at issue in Raleigh’s 
Case.  This second piece of evidence did not fit Justice Scalia’s theory, 
and he simply ignored it.  Another witness against Raleigh had repeated 
statements allegedly made by an absent and unnamed Portuguese 
gentleman, accusing Raleigh of participation in the conspiracy at issue.71  
Raleigh again objected: “[B]ut what proof is it against me?”72  And so, 
the second item of evidence raised the issue of trustworthiness.  The 
alleged statement by the unknown and unknowable Portuguese 
 
 62. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 
124-27 (discussing absence of factors recognized by the Court for departure from stare 
decisis). 
 63. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 124-27. 
 64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. 
 65. Id. at 50-51. 
 66. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 127-30. 
 67. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45. 
 68. The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, knt. at Winchester, for High Treason, in T.B. 
HOWELL, 2 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH 
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 15-16, 22-24 (1603); see also DAVID 
JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 435-520 (1832); Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 130. 
 69. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See JARDINE, supra note 68, at 436. 
 72. See id. 
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gentleman lacked any indicia of reliability,73 which was precisely the 
deciding issue under Ohio v. Roberts.74  But Justice Scalia was so 
determined to overrule that decision that his historical analysis bent the 
evidence. 
The aftermath of Crawford v. Washington was, in fact, the 
introduction of a series of unnecessary and unresolvable dilemmas.  If a 
victim during an incident of domestic violence calls 9-1-1, are her 
recorded statements testimonial efforts to convict the defendant, or are 
they excited utterances or contemporaneous statements motivated 
instead to escape the victim’s immediate plight?75  Or, if the 
admissibility of DNA evidence76 calls for inputs by up to forty different 
people, are all of their statements testimonial, so that all of them must be 
called to testify?77  These were among the questions the Court faced after 
Crawford.78 
But the confusion created by Crawford is not the immediate issue; 
instead, the problem lies in the second step of originalist interpretation, 
that of finding the historical meaning of the doctrines at issue.79  In this 
case, the question involved the meaning of the Confrontation Clause as 
a limit on hearsay evidence.80  The holding in Ohio v. Roberts was 
justified by a long history of decisions calling for indicia of reliability in 
hearsay evidence.81  That line of decisions included the principal case 
cited by Justice Scalia, if only he had not omitted key aspects of the 
case.82  Today, the Court is split in its interpretation of the prohibition of 
hearsay by the Confrontation Clause, but it arguably follows an 
originalist approach.  At least five Justices will exclude evidence that fits 
the core concern of the Clause: formal statements of evidence such as 
affidavits or depositions by witnesses, offered instead of testimony.83  
This approach, actually, is arguably closer to the historical concern than 
the complex construction erected by Justice Scalia.84 
 
 73. The declarant was unknown, and so were any possible reasons for inferring 
reliability. 
 74. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. 
 75. These issues arose in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829-30 (2006). 
 76. These issues arose in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 303 (2009) and 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
 77. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 677. 
 78. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 132-43 (discussing these cases). 
 79. See supra Section III.B. 
 80. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 150-55 (discussing this outcome). 
 84. See id. at 154-55 (discussing this possibility). 
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In summary, the second step in applying an originalist 
interpretation is the finding of an appropriate historical meaning of the 
doctrine at issue.  Making such a finding can be difficult and debatable.  
Sometimes, it is subject to result-oriented manipulation, as it was, 
unfortunately, in Crawford.85 
C. The Third Step: Fitting the Original Meaning to the Present Day 
The third step is sometimes the hardest one.  Having decided that 
originalism is the best approach, and having discerned an original 
meaning that seems convincing, the interpreter now has the task of fitting 
that original meaning to the circumstances of the present day.86  The 
difficulty lies in making analogies between a simpler time in America 
and the complexities of the modern day.  Radio and television did not 
exist when the First Amendment was adopted, but the original 
understanding included the freedom of speech, and therefore, the reader 
must attempt to fit this fundamental liberty to these very different 
media.87  The differences are fearsome, since the spectrum is limited and 
radio frequencies must be assigned by licenses, and they are scarce; and 
so, doctrines that fit naturally for newspapers require serious adaptation 
to fit the electronic media.88 
United States v. Jones89 provides a vehicle for consideration of the 
third step.  There, the FBI had surreptitiously attached a GPS device to 
the undercarriage90 of the defendant’s car.91  This electronic addition 
allowed law enforcement officers to track the paths taken by the 
defendant and furnished evidence used to convict him of cocaine-related 
offenses.92  But the installation of the device did not conform to the 
 
 85. This conclusion, result-orientation, follows from Justice Scalia’s failure to consider 
whether departure from stare decisis was justified as well as his treatment of the historical 
meaning of the Contract Clause, which included omission of contradictions in such authorities 
as Raleigh’s Case. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text; see supra notes 66-73 and 
accompanying text. 
 86. See supra Part II (discussing how originalism is determined). 
 87. The radio spectrum is limited, whereas the quantity of print media is not, and this 
difference affects how Government may perceive a need to make radio usage available. Cf. 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 n.4 (1969) (discussing effect of limited 
spectrum in creating need for regulation). The proliferation of cable channels has changed the 
situation, but the fundamental issue remains. 
 88. See id. at 373-77 (requiring free air time for commentators’ response to personal 
attacks by broadcasters). 
 89. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 90. Id. at 403. 
 91. The vehicle actually was registered to Jones’s wife, id. at 402, but used by Jones, and 
so the GPS device was used to track Jones’s movements, id. at 403. 
 92. Id. at 402-04. 
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warrant that allowed it,93 and therefore the Supreme Court, again per 
Justice Scalia, analyzed the case as one in which the Government’s 
actions were warrantless.94  The issue was deceptively simple: Did the 
use of the GPS monitor amount to a “search?”95 
The ostensible guide in such a situation was furnished by the 
venerable case96 of Katz v. United States.97  The act was a search, under 
this decision, if it intruded upon the defendant’s “expectation of 
privacy.”98  If this were the test, the case might be easily solved, because 
few of us are concerned with privacy as it is manifested on the underside 
of our vehicles,99 and none of us can claim a privacy right to avoid being 
seen as we drive our cars.100 
But Justice Scalia was more of a history buff than that.  He 
concluded that the idea of a search, at the time the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted, depended more heavily upon property rights than the Katz 
test did.101  The Founders, he thought, would have recognized a search 
in official conduct that amounted to a trespass.102  The entry upon 
another’s property was trespassory even if it was free of harm,103 and 
thus, the Jones case included a search by reason of the trespassory nature 
of the installation of the GPS device.104 
There were, of course, several arguments to the contrary offered by 
concurring Justices, whose opinions were really dissents to the trespass-
equals-search rationale.  For example, the “intrusion” was so slight that 
it hardly seemed an intrusion at all, and therefore hardly seemed a 
trespass.105  The device was not placed inside of the defendant’s 
property, but outside of it.106  And the trespass theory was so different 
from modern approaches that it seemed not to provide an analogy to the 
law of search today.107  In fact, the Katz approach seemed a better 
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analogy.108  At one point, Justice Alito suggests that a better comparison 
would be presented if “a constable secreted himself somewhere in a 
coach and remained there . . . to monitor the movements of the coach’s 
owner.”109  This possibility would seem to call for a very, very small 
constable, if he were equivalent to the GPS. 
And there was a difficulty that the members of the Court did not 
recognize.  Justice Scalia’s solution kept both the trespass theory and the 
Katz test in place.110  The result thus created a concept of searches that 
was deliberately wider than the concept as it existed at the time the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted, and this effect would seem to have 
violated the principle of originalism, which tries to keep meaning as it 
originally was.  Justice Scalia was untroubled, however, by this outcome.  
He treats the broadened Fourth Amendment as acceptable if the narrower 
one adopted by the Founders was acceptable.111  But covering activity as 
a search when it was not a search at the time of the Constitution would 
seem to offend originalist thinking just as surely as failing to cover a 
search that was so defined at the historical time. 
Jones shows the difficulty of the third step in originalism.  Justice 
Scalia’s logic about the historical analogy of trespass does have force.  
But his nonrecognition of the slight nature of the alleged intrusion, as 
well as his acceptance of the ill-fitting trespass theory in today’s 
treatment of privacy, make the analogy to the present day much weaker.  
This kind of difficulty seems likely to haunt originalism claims 
frequently, because the circumstances of today are always likely to 
represent change, either minor or monumental, from the circumstances 
of the Founders’ day. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One conclusion to which this discussion points is that the three steps 
required for originalist analysis can conspire to produce a result that is 
inferior to other possible methods of interpretation.  Each stage produces 
a certain quantum of ill-fitted applications, and the inevitable off-target 
nature of all three can cumulate.  And when they do, the degree to which 
the result deviates from sound interpretation can be significant.  But the 
deviation tends to remain unrecognizable, because each step will have 
seemed to make sense.  A court should be aware of this problem and use 
a different modality of interpretation if the end result of originalism does 
not make sense.  This decision, however, will be difficult to implement. 
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Sometimes, the most treacherous step will be the third.  For one 
reason, it is undertaken after the first and second steps have been 
navigated with apparent success, and it is natural for the third step, then, 
to seem less important.  For another reason, changes between the 
eighteenth century and today are inevitable and likely to be significant.  
And for yet another reason, the fitting of the original meaning to today’s 
very different institutions, mores, and customs is impossible to measure 
accurately, because it often is done by analogy, as is shown by the 
comparison of newspapers of the constitutional time to electronic media 
of today.  The uncertain application of the long-dead trespass theory in 
Jones also demonstrates this effect. 
The first step, calling for recognition of the need for originalism, 
can draw the interpreter into using the approach when it is not warranted 
or failing to use it when it might be the best method.  The solution to this 
dilemma may be simply to try originalism and to compare it to the result 
of another method such as textualism.  As for the second step, that of 
assigning original meaning to the doctrine at issue, Justice Scalia’s 
Crawford debacle suggests a similar approach: a court probably should 
attempt multiple methods of finding the original meaning, ranging from 
prior doctrine to dictionary definitions of the time.  Such an approach in 
Crawford probably would have resulted in retention of the simple, but 
accurate, test of Ohio v. Roberts, calling for a focus upon indicia of 
reliability in the type of hearsay at issue.  This doctrine was justified by 
a mass of pre-constitutional decisions, including the analysis in the 
Raleigh case that Justice Scalia ignored. 
Above all, a court could do better in adopting and applying 
originalism by retaining an awareness of the three distinct steps inherent 
in originalist analysis: first, recognizing the need for originalism; 
second, assigning an original meaning to the doctrine at issue; and third, 
adapting that meaning to the circumstances of today.  With that 
awareness, a court can take account of potential distortions at each stage 
and of their tendency to cumulate into real deviation from sound 
interpretation.  And then, only with a degree of humility not always 
found in judges who apply originalist methods, can a court make the best 
path to originalist, or to nonoriginalist, interpretations of ambiguous 
language. 
